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Editorial ruminations: publishing Kyklos
Abstract
Scholars today are under increasing pressure to publish in A journals, the main role of which consists in
certifying that a paper meets traditional academic standards. Consequences of this pressure are multiple
authorship, the slicing of ideas, and incentives to deviate from the truth. The overburdened reviewers'
evaluations are characterized by selfish efforts to protect their intel-lectual capital and to avoid risk. The
behaviour of editors depends much on whether there are a large or small number of editors. The editors
of Kyklos respond to these developments by welcoming innovative papers that go beyond standardized
orthodoxy.
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I. Major Changes in Economics Publishing 
 
Globalization has resulted in a marked increase in the number of academic economists 
who entered the international job market. Previously, the national markets were much 
more self-contained. Young economists could be confident to find a tenured 
professorship in their own country. During the recent decades, virtually all member 
countries of the European Union and many Asian countries have joined the 
international market for economists today dominated by the United States. While 
private connections and “old boys networks” remain an important instrument to 
obtain academic positions, to be published in internationally recognized journals have 
become a sine qua non. Many universities assign professorship professorships based 
on the number of publications in top academic journals and citations. 
At the same time the revolution of the Internet has opened new ways to “publish”. 
Everybody can put his or her writings on their homepage, in working paper series 
(such as SSRN, CESifo, or CREMA), in editorially run electronic journals (such as 
Economists´ Voice or Vox), and in organized or spontaneous blogs. These publication 
channels have the great advantage over traditional journals by being quick (often even 
immediate) and by approximating the idea of an intellectual discourse. There are few, 
if any, restrictions, i.e. there is generally no peer reviewing. Many scholars today keep 
themselves informed by screening, and selectively downloading, the summaries of 
these Internet publications. However, when the manifold existing versions are finally 
revised and printed in a journal, the paper is often only cited but rarely read. (In 
contrast, when their multiply revised definite versions are finally printed in journals, 
they are not anymore read but only cited. ) 
As a result, journal publications do no longer impart new knowledge and ideas but 
serve as a certification that a paper has been deemed worthy to a narrowly defined 
academic profession as judged by a particular selection of peer reviewers. The 
certification leads to a stratification into journal rankings. It has become customary to 
speak of “A”, “B”, and “C” journals. 
The fundamental change in the function of academic journals has led to an added 
burden on the profession. A steadily increasing number of papers papers have to be 
reviewed by a relatively small number of generally respected members of the 
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profession. On the other side, authors invest a tremendous amount of work into the 
revision of papers (which sometimes takes several years). There are also large 
psychological costs involved in having to follow the “wishes” (in reality rather the 
dictates) of the reviewers. It is detrimental that these activities are not performed to 
increase scientific insights but rather to enable the pursuit of an academic career. 
This note deals with some of the issues related to the current academic publication 
system. We want to show what the problems are that are faced by the editors of 
Kyklos, a general economics journal and how we react to these challenges. Section II 
deals with the necessity to publish. Section III discusses the behaviour of reviewers, 
and Section IV the behaviour of editors. The final section V summarizes how the 
editors of Kyklos deal with the changing situation of academic journal publishing. 
 
II. Consequences of Academic Economists´ Necessity to Publish 
 
The demand “publish or perish” has become more intensive with globalization and 
has induced academic economists to markedly change their behaviour. The major goal 
of academics has become to receive a good certification while the content of their 
research often no longer seems to matter. Many scholars do not first identify an 
important issue and worthwhile problem, which they then will analyse but rather they 
do the reverse. They only engage in the study of a subject if and when they can be 
assured beforehand that the data available are of such good quality that the advanced 
econometric methods can be applied. This applies, in particular, to the identification 
problem which has become of overarching importance in the economics discourse. 
The following three specific consequences have been extensively discussed in the 
literature and therefore are here only mentioned, but not discussed further: 
 
1. Increased specialization. To meet the strongly increasing demand  for 
a platform to professionally publish, a large number of new journals 
have been founded. There are now far more than 300 economics 
journals. They increasingly specialize in specific areas to distinguish 
themselves from each other. There is, for instance, a Journal of 
Economic Growth, of Productivity Analysis, of Transition, of 
Forecasting, of Economic Design, of Happiness Studies and of Wine 
Economics. 
2. Multiple authorship. There is a strong upward trend in the number of 
people that co-author an article. Sole authorship has become the 
exception, while we start to observe four or even five authors (where 
formerly there was one or two). 
3. Slicing of ideas. To put more than one idea into a paper is taken to be a 
waste. Rather, authors excel in finding the smallest possible 
publishable idea. 
 
There are two additional consequences, which have been discussed less often, perhaps 
because they are not very favourable for our profession. 
  
4. Impossible demands. Today, many faculties the world over expect 
scholars to publish in one of the top journals. A conservative estimate 
of academic economists wanting to publish repeatedly in these journals 
is perhaps 10,000, but there may well be more. During 2007, the five 
leading journals in economics (American Economic Review, Journal of 
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Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of 
Economic Studies, and Econometrica) published  275 1 papers. No less 
than 119 (or 43% of all papers) were authored by scholars who are 
associated with the leading US universities (Harvard, Yale, Princeton, 
MIT, Chicago, Berkeley and Stanford). These scholars must be 
considered well connected and insiders. Scholars living in the United 
States authored 224 (or 81%) of the 275 papers.  This leaves 51 
published articles for scholars from other nations. It is obviously 
impossible that the great mass of scholars can meet the demand to 
publish in these “A-journals” even if the present distribution of 
contributors is not sacrosanct. The demand to “publish in A-journals” 
thus asks the impossible from most scholars. The situation may, of 
course, be considered a tournament where few win but all participants 
are given an incentive to work hard. But it may also happen that the 
actual and potential “losers” are de-motivated and leave academia, or 
are deeply frustrated and resort to obstruction. This reaction may 
explain why referee reports written with respect to the work of other 
scholars are often devastatingly discouraging - provided referees may 
write the reports anonymously. The question arises whether the 
selection of people that this produces is favourable to the profession as 
a whole. The academic system not only needs “stars” but professionals 
who do good work that is not necessarily considered by their peers to 
be first class. It may well be that the best authors publishing in “B” or 
“C” journals are superior academics than the lesser ones publishing in 
“A-journals”. After all, academic activities go beyond publishing, and 
it should not be taken as self-evident that the best publishing scholars 
are also those well able and willing to teach students or to be active in 
the university administration, to advise governments, and to 
communicate with the general public. Scholars who need to 
“regularly” publish in the top journals have substantial opportunity 
costs to teach, at least if they are teaching undergraduates 2, as well as 
to engage in the other academic activities. 
 
5. Incentives to deviate from the truth. Academics who play the “publish 
or perish” game have a strong incentive to engage in the following 
practices 
(a) To cite strategically, in particular to abundantly mention (i.e. 
to bribe) all those scholars who could possibly be chosen as 
referees. Of course, this distorts the citation counts. 
(b) To abstain from a critical discussion of the existing state of 
knowledge in order not to offend potential referees. 
                                                
1 The Papers and Proceedings of the AER are excluded because many rankings do not 
consider them to belong to the absolute top publications.  
 
2 This is reflected in the fact that winners of grants often buy their way out of 
teaching. This means, of course, that teaching is considered a burden (a cost) to be 
evaded as far as possible. 
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(c) To accept all “suggestions” by the referees even if one knows 
that they are misleading or even incorrect. This has been 
termed “academic prostitution”.  
(d) To “massage” the data and the econometric estimation 
results, in particular the significance levels. In economics, to 
replicate the work published by others, and to reveal 
mistakes, usually is no promising strategy because the 
scholars exposed are likely to be among the referees. 
(e) To engage is plagiarism. Most scholars believe that this is 
unlikely but it is open whether this is true. 
 
Our journal is, as all other journals, affected by these developments. Kyklos did 
experience a case of a clearly plagiarized article (documented in Frey, Frey and 
Eichenberger 1999). 
But there is an additional effect. Scholars rationally first establish the property right of 
an idea by quickly putting a paper in one form or other on the Internet, and then 
submit it to one of the top economics journals. Only after having been rejected (which 
by necessity is almost always the case) they turn to the many field journals considered 
to be good, and only then to other general economics journals. These journals – such 
as the Economic Journal, Economica, or Kyklos – today are lower ranked due to the 
large number of specialized journals that have been launched to meet the steadily 
rising publication demand. 
 
The editors of Kyklos are well aware that they receive a considerable number of 
papers, which previously had been rejected by other journals. An easily visible sign of 
articles being “burnt” (as auctioneers would say) is when the authors present outdated 
statistics. We react to this situation by emphasizing original ideas in the sense of 
innovative, problem oriented work going beyond standard economics. Some 
economists have difficulties to understand what is thereby meant. We often receive 
papers claiming to be original but who just present a minor variation of a long-
established theory or model. The editors of Kyklos aim at receiving unconventional 
papers. We actively seek submissions contributing to our knowledge of the world 
beyond the narrow confines of the profession as it happens to define itself at the 
moment. We are prepared to trade-off technical prowess for ingenuity.  
 
III. The Behaviour of Reviewers 
 
Economists are (rightly) proud of their model of the behaviour of human beings in 
which selfishness plays a major role. Surprisingly enough, when it comes to 
reviewers, many editors seem to assume as a matter of course that reviewers act solely 
in the interest of economics as a science, or even in the interest of humankind, i.e. in 
an unselfish way. There are at least three types of behaviour inconsistent with this 
view. 
 
1. Preserving intellectual capital.  
Editors, with good reasons, send submissions to scholars who are knowledgeable 
about , and who previously published on, the particular topic of the paper submitted. 
However, it is exactly those scholars though  who have to lose most when a new idea 
is promoted that undermines the approaches and ideas they have championed over 
many years. Such reviewers knowingly or unknowingly introduce a marked 
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conservative bias. Well-established ideas tend to be favoured and unconventional 
ideas rejected particularly because the latter are normally less well formulated and 
tested than those following the trodden path. 
 
2. Risk aversion 
 Reviewers know about the high average rejection rates (often higher than 95%) of 
many journals. When they evaluate an article they rationally consider this base rate 
and reject a large share of the papers they receive. The cost of rejecting a paper to 
them is low (or zero) as they remain anonymous and  nobody (except the editor who 
is likely to concur) knows about the negative evaluation. In contrast, accepting a 
paper which later turns out to be unsound carries substantial costs as the editor 
questions the reviewers competence and may well inform other persons. Moreover, 
positively evaluating a novel idea is more difficult, time consuming and risky than 
rejecting it. This holds in particular when the other referees judge that an idea is not 
new. Then any reviewer advising acceptance will look rather foolish. To accept novel 
policy proposals is also risky because the author cannot yet produce any empirical 
evidence in favour of the proposal. The author can at best argue for the proposal by 
using analogies but this, at least partly, undermines the claim to originality. It follows 
that in most cases a reviewer is better off to advise rejection of a novel idea or policy 
proposal. Finding technical reasons is in general easily possible.  
 
3. Overburdened reviewers 
Well-known scholars, considered especially competent by the editor in charge, 
receive many demands to review papers. Due to time constraints they often pass the 
task on to their graduate students who draft the anonymous reports. These graduate 
students have to demonstrate to their professor that they master the established 
approaches. It is even more risky to them to advocate acceptance of an unorthodox 
contribution. As a result, the referee reports will be even more biased towards 
standard economics thanwould be the case if well-known and established scholars did 
the reviewing themselves. 
Obviously, the fact that many scholars are overburdened with refereeing leads to very 
long delays. It is somewhat surprising that in an age when interaction can take place at 
lightening speed, it takes many months, and sometimes even years, for editors to 
induce reviewers to write their reports. 
 
The peer referee system has many problems, which have been discussed in the 
literature and need not be repeated here. The outcome is a conservative slant working 
against moving economics more quickly into fruitful new directions. Instead, 
established economics and the corresponding technical prowess are supported.  
 
Many journals try to deal with the problems mentioned by sending a paper out to 
three, four and sometimes five people. While this helps to avoid certain biases, it 
seems to be the wrong answer to the underlying tendency to focus on technical 
prowess rather than interesting content. It even worsens the problem of overburdened 
reviewers. 
 
The editors of Kyklos seek to overcome the problem in a different way. They ask for 
verbal advice from referees. Due to the personal contacts involved, this procedure has 
the advantage of being much quicker than written referee reports. In our experience 
they also tend to be less derogative as we can ensure that embittered scholars are 
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excluded. For the same reason, the referees are less inclined to make the authors cite 
their work as regularly happens with anonymous written reports. The verbal reports 
collected are only taken as a piece of advice; they mainly serve to see to what extent 
and how a paper can be improved. The editors of Kyklos are prepared to decide on 
their own whether a paper is acceptable for publication, and they are prepared to 
shoulder the corresponding responsibility. They see their major task in evaluating 
whether a paper according to their own views is “interesting” in the sense of being 
novel and relevant. As the emphasis is on innovative issues and ideas and less on 
technique, unknown and less experienced scholars get a fair chance of being able to 
publish in Kyklos. Often, their papers are not exactly written in the orthodox way but 
may nevertheless contain valuable new insights. 
 
 
IV. The Behaviour of Editors 
 
The behaviour of editors is shaped by the institutional conditions of their task. It is 
useful to distinguish two extreme situations: 
 
1. Only one editor.   
In this case, the editor is closely associated with the journal edited; he or she 
essentially owns the property rights to the journal. An editor who is able to attract 
path-breaking contributions gains recognition by his or her peers as it is generally 
known who is in charge. He or she therefore has a strong incentive to seek novel and 
relevant papers. 
This institutional condition has become rare among economics journals. Nevertheless, 
it is useful to remember that John Maynard Keynes for a long time was the sole editor 
of the Economic Journal, as George Stigler was of the Journal of Political Economy 
when these journals were at the height of their importance in the profession. 
 
2. Large number of editors. 
The larger the number of persons in the (managing) editorial board, the larger is the 
diffusion of responsibility. The standing of the journal becomes a public good. 
Perhaps even more importantly, the decision on which papers will be accepted for 
publication has to be reached within a committee. In order to preserve a good 
atmosphere, consensus is sought with the unfortunate consequence that papers with 
standard ideas have a better chance than contributions with innovative ideas which 
almost by necessity are less polished and thus more open to critique. It is notoriously 
difficult to convince a group of scholars that it may make sense to accept an article, 
which is original but technically not perfect when there are more mainstream 
submissions without technical shortcomings, which can so easily be pinpointed. 
Most journals today have a large number of editors. According to a narrow definition, 
the AER has 9 editors; the JPE has 6, the QJE 3, the RES 5 and Econometrica 8. If a 
broader definition, i.e. the editorial board, is used, the respective number of editors is 
much larger, namely 44, 6, 25, 52, and 49, respectively. The top economics journals 
thus are certainly faced with the problems of diffusion of responsibility and the need 
for consensus.  
 
Kyklos has three editors deciding about acceptance or rejection. This small number of 
people enables us to choose those papers, we consider to be innovative and relevant. 
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We are not afraid of being charged with not following what today is generally 
considered standard economics. 
 
V. Managing Kyklos 
 
The editors are well aware that they cannot change existing trends but they hope to be 
able to signal to the economics community that it is possible to pursue a “niche” 
strategy, not conforming to how journal editing is normally done. This involves 
allowing editors to openly pursue their intrinsic preferences of what they deem to be 
innovative and relevant (while observing obvious constraints). In order to go beyond 
general statements, a set of papers published in Kyklos is listed below which the 
editors judge to come near to what they endeavour. The selection is limited to the last 
five years. This does, of course, not mean that other papers are downgraded; indeed 
when we went through the past volumes each of us indicated many more articles 
which for one reason or other he specially liked. 
 
Here is a set of preferred papers previously published in Kyklos (2004-2008), in 
alphabetical order of the first author: 
- Behavioral Economics and Perverse Effects of the Welfare State, by Scott 
Beaulier and Bryan Caplan (2007); 
- The price of bodies: A hedonic pricing model of avatar attributes in a synthetic 
world, by Edward Castranova (2004); 
- Is God Good for Trade? by Matthias Carl Helble (2007); 
- Getting Along with Colleagues – Does Profit Sharing Help or Hurt? by John  
Heywood, Uwe Jirjahn and Georgi Tsertsvadze (2005); 
- Does Child Labor Reduce Youth Crime? by Andrew Horowitz and Julie 
Trivitt (2007); 
- Does Government Matter? Yes, No or Maybe: Some Evidence from 
Developing Countries, by M. G. Quibria (2006); 
- Attractive physical appearance vs. good academic characteristics, by Hung-
Lin Tao (2008); 
- Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Who Is the Happiest of Them All? by Benno 
Torgler, Nemana Abtic and Uwe Dulleck (2008). 
 
 
The papers chosen do not necessarily reflect the number of citations produced (the 
papers were chosen independent of citations). Indeed, some of the papers did not get 
much attention from economists, while others accumulated a substantial number of 
citations.  
 
The reaction of the editors of Kyklos to the major changes in journal publishing 
experienced due to globalization can be summarized in the following way: 
 
1. Kyklos remains a general economics journal wide open to contributions from 
other social sciences; 
2. Kyklos is a strongly internationally orientated review going beyond isolated 
countries (including the United States); 
3. The editors continue to make quick decisions (normally within two months, 
often even within one month). This makes our review specially attractive for 
scholars under strong publication pressure; 
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4. Kyklos welcomes contributions addressing real life issues (rather than 
variations of existing theories) based on sound analysis and especially 
empirical research; 
5. Most importantly, the editors of Kyklos want to publish innovative papers 
going beyond standardized orthodoxy. 
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